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Abstract 
We construct a model to analyze the two types of tender procedures used by 
the European Central Bank (ECB) in its open market operations. We assume 
that the EeB minimizes the expected value of a loss function that depends 
on the quadratic difference between the interbank rate and a target interest 
rate that characteri:!:es the stance of monetary policy. We show that when the 
loss function penalizes more heavily interbank rates below the target, fi.xed rate 
tenders have a unique equilibrium characterized by e.xtreme overbidding. We 
also show that variable rate tenders have multiple equilibria characterized by 
varying degrees of overbidding, and that in these tenders an equilibrium without 
overbidding can be obtained by preannouncing the intended liquidity injection. 
Finally, our empirical analysis supports the assumption of an asymmetric loss 
function for the ECB. 

1 Introduction 
The monetary policy instruments chosen by the European Central Bank (ECB)' in 
order to implement its monetary policy are (i) minimum required reserves, (ii) open 
market operations, and (iii) standing facilities. The reserve requirement helps to 
ensure that the euro area banking system has an aggregate liquidity deficit which is 
covered by two main types of open market operations: the main refinancing operations 
and the longer-term refinancing operations. The former (latter) are liquidity providing 
collateralized transa<:tions with a weekly (monthly) frequency and a maturity of two 
weeks (three months). The banks can also obtain or pla<:e overnight liquidity at the 
marginal lending and deposit standing fa<:ilities. 
The refinancing operations can be conducted via either fixed rate or variable rate 
tenders. In fixed rate tenders the ECB announces an interest rate and the banks bid 
the amount of liquidity they want to borrow at this rate. If the aggregate amount bid 
exceeds the amount of liquidity that the ECB wants to provide, ea<:h bank receives 
a pro rata share of this liquidity. In variable rate tenders the banks bid the amounts 
they want to borrow and the interest rates they are willing to pay. In this case, 
bids with successively lower interest rates are accepted until the total liquidity to be 
allotted is exhausted. 
Up to now the longer-term refinancing operations have been conducted via variable 
rate tenders. On the other hand, from the beginning of the Monetary Union in 
January 1999 until June 2000 the main refinancing operations were conducted via 
fixed rate tenders. A striking feature of these tenders was the very high degree of 
overbidding by the banks. For example, the median allotment ratio (i.e. the ratio 
between the allotted amount and the total amount bid) during this period was 6.10%, 
with a minimum value of only 0.87%. In fact, the decision to switch to variable rate 
tenders taken by the Governing Ccuncil of the ECB in June 2000 was justified as " ... a 
response to the severe overbidding which has developed in the context of the current 
fixed rate tender procedure.,,2 
1 Strictly speaking we should refer to the monetary policy of the EUTosystem, which comprises 
the ECB and the national central banks of the countries that have adopted the euro. However since 
the Eurosystem has no legal personality and is governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB, 
with a slight abuse of terminology, in this paper we will simply use the latter term. 
2The switch to variable rate tenders had been advocated among others by the 1999 International 
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The purpose of this paper is to propose a theoretical model of the tender pro­
cedures used by the EeE in order to. analyze the equilibrium behavior of the banks 
under fixed and variable rate tenders. The model can shed light on various issues 
like the source of the overbidding in fixed rate tenders, the differences between single 
variable rate tenders (also known as uniform or "Dutch") and multiple variable rate 
tenders (also known as discriminatory or "American"), and the possible effects (in 
both fixed and variable rate tenders) of announcing the desired liquidity injection 
prior to the tender. 
The model has a large number of identical risk neutral banks that can obtain 
liquidity from the central bank or in an interbank market. The central bank provides 
liquidity through a fixed or a variable rate tender. It is assumed that the interbank 
interest rate is a decreasing function of the liquidity allotted by the central bank in the 
tender, and also depends on the realization of a liquidity shock. The main difference 
between this setup and a standard multiple unit auction is that the seller (the central 
bank) does not want to maximize revenue. Instead, the central bank wants to steer 
the interbank rate towards a target rate that characterizes the stance of monetary 
policy' Formally, we assume that the central bank minimizes the expected value of a 
loss function that depends on the quadratic difference between the interbank rate and 
the target rate. This expectation is taken conditional on the information collected by 
the central bank on the future realization of the liquidity shock. 
We show that when the loss function of the central bank is symmetric, fixed and 
variable rate tenders (both Dutch and American) have the same multiple equilibrium 
outcomes. Moreover, in these outcomes there is always some overbidding. On the 
other hand, when the loss function of the central bank is asymmetric in the sense of 
penalizing more heavily interbank rates below the target, then the nature of equilibria 
does not change for variable rate tenders, but fixed rate tenders have now a unique 
equilibrium characterized by extreme overbidding. �n addition, we show that except 
in this latter case, the set of equilibrium outcomes becomes larger (and even includes 
an equilibrium without overbidding) when the central bank announces its intended 
Capital Markets report of the lntemational Monetary Fund, and the 2000 Monitoring the European 
Central report of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
3In the 1999 Annual Report it is stated that ''The BeB tended to orient its allotment decisions 
towards ensuring an average interbank overnight rate close to the tender rate." 
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liquidity injection prior to the tender. 
The intuition for these results is the following. When the loss function is asym­
metric, the central bank is more concerned about letting the interbank rate fall below 
the target, and for this reason it supplies less liquidity than the one required to keep 
the average interbank rate equal to the target rate. In fixed rate tenders, the differ­
ential between the average interbank rate and rate at which the liquidity is provided 
generates an expected profit for the banks which is increasing in the quantity allotted. 
Hence, they have an incentive to increase the size of their bid. In contrast, in variable 
rate tenders, the banks fully compensate this differential by offering higher rates, so 
in equilibrium they will be indifferent as to the amount bid (as long as it exceeds the 
central bank's desired liquidity injection). On the other hand, when the loss function 
of the central bank is symmetric, the average interbank rate will be equal to the target 
rate, and fixed and variable rate tenders will have the same outcomes. 
In order to address the issue of whether overbidding is a problem, we extend the 
model to the case where the banks differ in the amount of collateral available for 
borrowing from the central bank. In this case we show that, in fixed rate tenders, 
when the loss function of the central bank is asymmetric, the high collateral banks 
will get a higher payoff than the low collateral banks. To the extent that different 
banking practices in the various countries of the euro zone imply that banks with 
similar balance sheets may have very different levels of collateralizable assets,4 we 
conclude that fixed rate tenders may lead to unequal treatment of banks by the ECB. 
It is important to stress that with a perfectly competitive interbank market, liquidity 
can be redistributed across the area at no cost, so this would not be a problem of 
efficiency but a problem of distribution (of rents from the ECB to the banks). 
Given the difference in the outcomes under symmetry or asymmetry of the loss 
function of the central bank:, we use data from the 76 fixed rate tenders conducted 
during the period January 1 999 - June 2000 to estimate the asymmetry parameter of 
the loss function of the ECB. The results indicate that this parameter is significantly 
different from zero, which is consistent with the extreme overbidding behavior of 
4 A distinction is made between two categories of collateral. Tier one assets consists of marketable 
debt instruments fulfilling uniform euro area-wide eligibility criteria specified by the ECa. Tier two 
consists of additional assets, marketable and non-marketable, which are of particular importance for 
national financial markets and banking systems and for which eligibility criteria are established by 
the national central banks, subject to ECB approval. See ECB (1998, Chapter 6). 
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the banks in these tenders. In addition, the switch to variable rate tenders that 
took place in June 2000 provides a natural experiment to test our theoretical model. 
We show that the evidence on the behavior of the marginal interest rate of the 9 
American auctions conducted during the period June - August 2000 is in line with 
the predictions of the model. 
The closest reference to our work is the paper by Nautz and Oechssler (1999). 
They construct a model of strategic bidding in fixed rate tenders in which there 
is no interbank market and the banks minimize a quadratic loss function in the 
deviations between the liquidity allotted by the central bank and the liquidity required 
by them. Their main result is that the fixed rate tender game does not have an 
equilibrium. Cataliio Lopes (2000) compares the performance of fixed and variable 
rate tenders in the context of a model with an interbank market. She shows that 
switching from the former to the latter ameliorates the overbidding problem. Perez­
Quir6s and Rodriguez-Mendizabal (2000) propose a model of the behavior of the 
interbank rate over the reserve maintenance period that tries to explain the evidence 
for Germany before and after the adoption of the euro. Finally, Bindseil (2000) focuses 
on whether the central bank should announce its forecast of the autonomous liquidity 
creation factors before the tender. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sections 3 and 
4 analyze the equilibrium of fixed and variable rate tenders, respectively. Section 
5 extends the previous results to the case where the banks differ in the amount of 
collateral. Section 6 contains our empirical estimation of the asymmetry parameter of 
the loss function of the EeB. Section 7 offers a some concluding remarks. Appendix 
A presents a simple model of the interbank market that is used to motivate the 
equilibrium interest rate equation that appears in the text, and Appendix B contains 
the proofs of all the results. 
2 The Model 
Consider a model with two dates (t = 0, 1) and two types of agents: a central bank, 
and a continuum of measure one of identical risk neutral private banks. At date 0 
the central bank provides an amount of liquidity I using one of several possible tender 
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procedures to be described in detail below. At date 1 there is an interbank market 
where the private banks can trade their excess liquidity at an interest rate T. 
The equilibrium interest rate in the interbank market is given by 
r = ,,- (31 + e, (1) 
where Ct' and /3 are positive coefficients, and e is a random disturbance with zero 
mean. Equation (1) has two main features. First, the equilibrium interbank rate 
depends negatively on the liquidity I provided by the central bank at date O. Second, 
it is subject to random shocks. Both features are rationalized in the model of the 
interbank market presented in Appendix A.a 
At date 0 the central bank observes a signal 7] which is correlated with the liquidity 
shock e. Specificall:'. we assume that 
e = 7] + U, (2) 
where 7] and u are independent random variables with zero mean, so E(e I 7]) = 7]. 
We also assume that ry has a compact support i!1,1)]' and we let F(u) denote the 
cumulative distribution function of u. 
The interpretation of these shocks is as follows: g captures the effect on the 
equilibrium interbank rate of autonomous liquidity creation and absorption factors 
(like changes in cash holdings, net government deposits with the central bank, etc.), 
while 7] captures the estimate that the central bank has on this effect based on its 
forecast of these factors, and u is the error term. 
The central bank wants to steer the equilibrium interbank rate T towards a target 
rate r that characterizes the stance of monetary policy. If the liquidity injection were 
done at date 1, the central bank could effectively ensure that T = r by setting 
l=a-r+c 
{3 . 
5In this model the representative bank is subject to·a reserve requirement that has to be fulfilled 
on average over a two-date maintenance period. The averaging provision means that bank reserves 
held on any date are perfect substitutes for the purpose of satisfying the requirement. As noted 
by Campbell (1987) and Hamilton (1996) among others, this implies that interbank rates follow a 
martingale. Moreover, the equilibrium interbank rate at the first date of the maintenance period 
will be a weighted average of the interest rates of the marginal lending and deposit facilities, with 
weights that are, respectively, decreasing and increasing in the liquidity initially provided by the 
central bank. 
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This corresponds to the procedure used by the Federal Reserve System in its open 
market operations.6 
However, in our framework the central bank has to decide on l before the liquidity 
shock c is realized, so the equilibrium interbank rate r will in general differ from 
the target rate r. In setting the liquidity injection I at date 0 we will assume that 
the central bank minimizes the conditional expected. value of a loss function that 
depends on the quadratic difference between the interbank rate r and the target rate 
r. Specifically, we asswne the following objective function 
(3) 
where l["<Tl is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when r < r. Although 
the parameter f could in principle be negative, we will restrict attention to the case 
"I :::: O. If "I > 0 the central bank loss function ·is asymmetric, with interbank rates 
below the target r penalized more heavily than rates above the target. If "I = 0 the 
loss function is symmetric. 
Given this objective function, the following result characterizes the desired liquid­
ity injection of the central bank. 
Lemma 1 The centrol bank desired liquidity injection is described by the function 
( ) a-r,+1) s'11]= !3 '  (4) 
where r'1 is increasing in "I with TO = r. 
The liquidity supply function s,(1)) is linearly increasing in the signal 1). This means 
that when the central bank will want to inject more liquidity when it anticipates tight 
conditions in the interbank market (i.e. observes a high ry). On the other hand, for 
'Y > 0 we have T"'t > TO = P, 50 a central bank with an asynunetric loss function will 
want to provide, ceteris paribus, less liquidity than a central bank with a symmetric 
loss function. 
Substituting the function s,(1)) into the interest rate equation (1), and taking into 
account the definition of u in (2), gives 
T=T"'t+U, (5) 
61t should be noted that, although feasible, this type of fine-tuning operations are not usually 
executed by the ECa. 
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which implies E(r I ry) = r,. Hence a central bank with a symmetric loss function 
will try to achieve an interbank rate that, on average, is equal to the target rate 1', 
while a central bank with an asynunetric loss function will aim at higher average 
interbank rates. These implications of Lemma 1 will be useful to provide intuition 
for the results in the following sections. 
3 Equilibrium Analysis of Fixed Rate Tenders 
Suppose that at date 0 the central bank provides liquidity to the banks through a fixed 
rate tender. In this procedure the representative bank submits a bid b and receives 
an allotment I at the target interest rate T, which is announced by the central bank 
prior to the tender. 
To begin with we shall assume that the bid b cannot exceed the amount of collateral 
c that the bank holds, so b E [0, cJ . We also assume that the minimum desired liquidity 
injection (that is, the one that corresponds to the lowest signal!1.) is positive, so 
(6) 
and that the representative bank has sufficient collateral to cover the maximwn de­
sired liquidity injection (that is, the one that corresponds to the highest signal iJ) , 
so 
s,(iJ) < c. (7) 
If s denotes the liquidity that the central bank decides to provide, and b" is the 
total amount bid then 
(8) 
According to this expression) the bank gets the amount b it bid unless the total 
amount bid b'" exceeds the amount s that the central bank wants to inject, in which 
case the bank gets the fraction sib" of the amount bid b. 
The tender procedure is modeled as a noncooperative game between the central 
bauk and the representative bank. The game is sequential: the central bank decides on 
s after observing the total amount bid b"'. Moreover, we assume that the representative 
bank knows the loss function of the central bank (in particular, the value of the 
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asymmetry parameter "Y), but it does not observe (nor the central bank reveals) the 
value of the signal 1] on the liquidity conditions in the interbank market at date 1. 
In a symmetric equilibrium it must be the case that b = b*, so the central bank 
provides an amount of liquidity equal to 
l = min {b·, s}. (9) 
Substituting this expression into the interest rate equation (1), gives the following 
equilibrium interbank rate 
r = <>-i3min{b·, s}+e. (10) 
The next result characterizes the dominant strategy of the central bank in the 
fixed rate tender game. 
Lemma 2 In the fi:xed rate tender the central bank will choose s = s,(1)). 
The reason why s = s,(1)) is a dominant strategy is easy to explain. In deciding 
on its provision of liquidity, the central bank has to take into account the constraint 
that the liquidity injection l cannot exceed the total amount bid b'. If this constraint 
is not binding, by Lemma 1 we have s = s,(1)). On the other hand, if this constraint 
is binding (that is, if s,(1)) > b'), since the central bank's objective function is con­
tinuous in s, strictly convex for s < b*, and constant for s ;::: b*, it is clear that any 
s 2: b' will be optimal, so we can take s = s,(1)). 
The representative bank chooses its bid b E [0, c] in order to maximize 
E[l(r - f)l. (11) 
That is, the bank maximizes the expected return obtained by placing in the interbank 
market at the interest rate r the quantity l allotted by the central bank at the rate 
f. This objective function is justified in the model of the interbank market presented 
in Appendix A. 
The following result characterizes the equilibrium of the fixed rate tender. 
Proposition 1 In the fi:xed rate tender, when the loss function of the central bank 
is asymmetric ("Y > 0) there is a unique equilibrium in which the representative bank 
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bids b = c, whereas when the loss junction is symmetric (-y = 0) any bid b E [so(1)), c] 
constitutes an equilibrium. In either case, the central bank provides an amount of 
liquidity equal to s"( (TJ), and the expected equilibrium interbank mte is T /' 
To explain the intuition for this result notice that, when "I > 0, the equilibrium 
interest rate equation (10) together Lemma 1 implies that for any b' we have 
Hence when the loss function of the central bank is asymmetric, the expected equi­
librium interbank rate will always be above the interest rate f at which the central 
bank allocates funds in the tender. Since the quantity allotted to the representative 
bank is an increasing function of its bid, it follows that the bank has an incentive to 
bid the maximum amount c. 
On the other haud, when, = 0 ,  the equilibrium interest rate equation (10) to­
gether with Lemma 1 implies 
E(r ) = E[Q-jJmin{b',so(1))} +<]2 E[Q-jJso(1))+1)+u] =ro = f, 
with strict inequality for (high) realizations of 1) for which b' < sO(1)). Hence if b' < 
so(m we have E(r) > r, so the representative bank has an incentive to bid the 
maximwn amount c, which contradicts the asswnption b* < 80(:ry) < c. Therefore we 
must have b' 2 so(1)) , in which case E(r) = f, the payoff of the representative bauk 
is always zero, and b 
= 
b" is an equilibrium bid. 
The preceding discussion can be summarized as follows: Proposition 1 implies 
that, on average, the equilibrium interbank rate r will be above the central bank 
target rate f if and only if the loss function of the central bank is asymmetric. Hence 
when 'Y > 0 there is a unique equilibrium characterized by extreme overbidding, 
whereas when 'Y = 0 there is a continuum of equilibria such that the total amount 
bid is greater than or equal to the central bank's maximum liquidity injection.7 
We next analyze what would happen if prior to the tender the central bank reveals 
its information f} (or, equivalently, announces its desired liquidity injection 8,(17)).8 
7Thus the equilibrium correspondence jumps discontinuously at the point I = O. 
sObserve that since the function 8,(1]) is increasing and the representative bank knows the pa­
rameter "(, then learning the value of 8,(1]) is equivalent to learning 1]. 
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The sequence of moves in the game between the central bank and the representative 
bank is now reversed, with the central bank moving first. 
Proposition 2 If in the fixed rate tender the central bank preannounces the liquidity 
51'(7]) it intends to provide, there is no change in the equilibrium bid when the loss 
function of the central bank is asymmetric (l' > 0), whereas when the loss function 
is symmetric b = 0) any bid b E [so(� ) , c[ constitutes an equilibrium. In either 
case, the central bank provides an amount of liquidity equal to 51'(7]), and the expected 
equilibrium interbank rote is r 1" 
The intuition for this result is easy to explain. When 'Y > 0 the announcement 
has no effect on the equilibrium bid, since as noted. above, for any b·, the expected 
equilibrium interbank rate will always be above the interest rate T at which the central 
bank allocates funds in the tender. Hence the representative bank has an incentive 
to bid the maximum amount c. On the other hand, when l' = 0 we have E(r) > f if 
and only if b' < so(�) , so we now rule out equilibrium bids below so(� ) .  
Up until now, we  have assumed that the bid b submitted by the representative 
bank cannot exceed its collateral c. The results when the bank is allowed to bid any 
bE [0, El, with E > c, are easy to derive using the same arguments as in the proofs of 
Propositions 1 and 2. When the central bank does not announce its desired. liquidity 
injection, the equilibrium bid will be ii, if l' > 0, and any b E [so (11) , iij, if l' = o. And 
when the central bank announces s,(�) prior to the tender, the equilibrium bid will 
be ii, if l' > 0, and any b E [so(� ) ,  iij, if l' = O. Finally, there will be no equilibrium 
when l' > 0 and ii = 00. 
The case ii = 00 is relevant in the light of the statement of the ECB of 2 February 
1 999 clarifying that " ... the valid interpretation of the General Documentation allows 
tender bids not actually covered by collateral at the time of submission of the bids, 
and just requires the financial capacity to have the collateral on the date of settlement 
of the tender." For this reason, the nonexiste�ce of equilibrium for .'Y > 0 deserves 
further analysis. Nautz and Oechssler (1 999) get the same result , and then propose a 
myopic adjustment process that generates an increasing sequence of bids. However, 
this process implicitly assumes some bounded rationality on the part of the banks 
which does not seem very plausible (at least after the initial learning is completed). 
An alternative approach would be to modify the model in order to get back existence. 
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For example, one could introduce penalties for "excessive bidding." Such penalties 
are in fact contemplated in the ECB's General Documentation (1998, p.30) that 
" ... provides for the possibility to check underlying assets available to counterparties 
in order to detect cases of excessive bidding and to impose penalties if such excessive 
bidding is evidenced."g Exploring in detail this alternative is left for future work. 
The results in this section indicate that overbidding by the banks in the fixed 
rate tender is explained by the asymmetry of the loss function of the central bank, 
specifically its reluctance to see interbank interest rates fall below the target rate r. 
In this case the central bank supplies less liquidity than that needed to ensure that 
E( T) = T, so it is rational for the banks to bid the maximum possible amount; and 
if there is no such upper bound (or there are no penalties for "excessive bidding"), 
an equilibrium does not exist. On the other hand, if the loss function of the central 
bank is symmetric, there is a continuum of equilibria in which the banks are always 
rationed, unless the central bank preannounces its desired liquidity injection, in which 
case there is also an equilibrium without overbidding (that is with b' = so(�)). 
4 Equilibrium Analysis of Variable Rate Tenders 
In variable rate tenders, the representative bank bids an amount b at an interest 
rate 1'. The central bank orders the bids according to the interest rate offered, and 
successively lower interest rates are accepted until the total liquidity to be allotted is 
exhausted. In the single rate (or uniform or "Dutch") auction the interest rate applied 
for all satisfied bids is the marginal interest rate (the lowest interest rate accepted). In 
the multiple rate (or discriminatory or "American") auction the interest rate applied 
is the rate offered for each accepted bid. 
In variable rate tenders the behavior of the central bank is identical to the one 
described in the previous section, namely it chooses to supply the amount of liquidity 
s"(�). This follows from the assumption that the central bank only cares about the 
deviations of the equilibrium interbank rate r from the target rate r, and not about 
the marginal (or the average) rate applied to successful bids in the tender. 
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We next examine the equilibriwn outcome of the two types of auction. 
4.1 The Dutch Auction 
In the Dutch auction the representative bank chooses its bid b E [0 , cl and offered 
interest rate r in order to maximize 
where 
I(s) = { 
b, 
min {b, f.b} , 
0, 
E[I(s)(r - i(s))1 
if either r > r*, or r < T* and s > b* 
if r = i* 
ifr<i*ands:Sb* 
its) = { i, 
T" , 
iff < T" and s > b* 
otherwise 
(12) 
(13) 
and b* and i* denote, respectively, the amount bid and the interest rate offered by 
all the other banks (assuming a symmetric equilibrium). 
In words, the representative bank gets the amount bid b if it offers an interest 
rate r higher than the interest rate r* offered by the other banks, or if r < i* and r 
happens to be the marginal interest rate in the auction. It gets 
if it offers r = i*. Finally, it gets 0 if it offers r < i* and T* is the marginal interest 
rate of the auction. Notice that when r = ? (which will obtain in a symmetric 
equilibrium) the only difference between this objective function and the one in the 
previous section is the fact that now the bank pays the marginal interest rate i*, 
instead of the target rate T, for the quantity allotted. 
It is important to stress that in the analysis that follows the representative bank 
is assumed to know both the interest rate f that characterizes the stance of monetary 
policy, and the value of the parameter 'Y that characterizes the loss function of the 
central bank. Obviously, this raises the issue of how the central bank may signal the 
rate T. We will come back to this issue at the end of this section. 
The next result characterizes the symmetric equilibrium of the Dutch auction. 
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Proposition 3 In the Dutch auction, any bid bE [s,(iJ), c[ at the interest rate i' = r, 
constitutes an equilibrium in which the central bank provides an amount of liquidity 
equal to s, (ry), and the expected equilibrium interbank rate i.s r,. 
Proposition 3 shows that when the loss function of the central bank is symmetric 
the outcome of the Dutch auction is the same as the outcome of the fixed. rate tender: 
the banks bid a sufficiently large amount (that implies that they are always going to 
be rationed) at the rate TO = f (which is the expected equilibrium interbank rate). 
On the other hand, when the loss function is asymmetric there is no longer a unique 
equilibrium at the corner with maximum bids, but a continuum of equilibria in which 
the banks bid a sufficiently large amount at the rate r, (which is now the expected 
equilibrium interbank rate). 
Thus in the Dutch auction the nature of equilibrium is the same for all "f 2:: O. 
The reason for this result is that the banks correct for the bias in the loss function 
of the central bank by offering an interest rate that equals the expected equilibrium 
interbank rate and for which their payoff is always zero. 
We next analyze what happens when the central bank reveals ry (or, equivalently, 
announces its desired liquidity injection s,(ry)) prior to the tender. 
Proposition 4 If in the Dutch auction the central bank preannounces the liquidity 
s,(ry) it intends to provide, any bid b E [s,(ry),c[ at the interest rate r, constitutes an 
equilibrium in which the central bank provides an amount of liquidity equal to s,(1)), 
and the expected equilibriu.m interbank rate is r"'(. 
The only difference between this result and Proposition 3 is that now the range of 
equilibrium bids is [s,(ry), c[, rather than [s,(iJ), c[, so there is always an equilibrium 
without overbidding. Moreover, one can argue that the announcement of intended 
liquidity injection by the central bank may serve as coordination device for the banks 
in the presence of multiple equilibria, in which case the equilibrium in which the 
banks bid b = s,(ry) may actually obtain. 
Finally, in the case where the representative bank is allowed to bid any b E [0, bJ, 
with ii > c, it is easy to derive that, for any -y 2: 0, any bid b E [s,(ij) , bJ (or any 
bE [s,(ry), bJ when the central bank reveals ry) at the interest rate r, constitutes an 
equilibrium. Thus even when b = 00 an equilibrium always exists. 
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4.2 The American Auction 
In the American auction the representative bank chooses its bid b E [0, cJ and offered 
interest rate T in order to maximize 
E[l(s)(r - 1')]. 
where l(s) is given by (12). 
The American auction is the same as the Dutch auction except that now the 
bank always pays the interest rate T offered, instead of the marginal interest rate 
of the auction r( s). Despite this difference, following the arguments in the proofs of 
Propositions 3 and 4 on� can show that the equilibrium outcomes of the American 
auction are the same as those of the Dutch auction. Hence the representative bank 
will bid any b E [s,(ill, cJ (or any b E [s,(ry), cJ when the central bank reveals ry) at 
the interest rate r = T-Yl and its equilibrium payoff will be zero.IO 
A concern that arises in the case of variable rate tenders is bow the central. bank 
may signal the stance of monetary policy. In fixed rate tenders, this is achieved by the 
announcement of the interest rate f at which the liquidity allotted. is going to provided. 
In variable rate tenders the marginal interest rate is endogenously determined, so 
this signal is no longer available. In its decision of June 2000 to switch from fixed 
to variable rate tenders in the main refinancing operations, the ECB addressed this 
problem by introducing a minimum bid rate, and stating that "for the purpose of 
signalling the monetary policy stance, the minimum bid is designed to play the role 
performed, until now, by the rate in fixed rate tenders." In the context of our model 
one can check that the constraint that the interest rates offered by the banks be 
greater than or equal to the target rate f does not alter any of the arguments in 
the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4, so we have exactly the same characterization of 
equilibria. 
A second concern is whether the volatility of the interbank rate would be higher 
with variable rate tenders. But as long as the central bank can signal effectively 
the target rate f, equation (5) together with Propositions 1-4 imply that Var(r) = 
IONotice that if the bank offers a lower rate r < r., its payoff will be zero (since l(s) 
= 
0), while 
and if it offers a higher rate r > T-r its payoff will be negat.ive (since E[l(s)(T - r)] = b(T-r - T) < 0), 
so these deviations are not profitable. 
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Var(u) regardless of the type of tender and regardless of whether the central bank 
preannounces its intended liquidity injection. 
The results in this section show that if the loss function of the central bank 
is asymmetric, and as long as the central bank can signal effectively the stance of 
monetary policy, switching to variable rate tenders makes it possible achieve equilibria 
with moderate overbidding at no cost in terms of the volatility of the interbank 
rate. Moreover) in the case where the central bank preannounces its desired liquidity 
injection an equilibrium without overbidding may be selected by the banks. 
5 The Model with Heterogeneous Banks 
This section extends our previous results to the case where the banks differ in the 
amount of collateral that they hold for borrowing from the central bank. Specifically, 
we postulate a cumulative distribution function of collateral, H(c), with support [0, cJ, 
and consider the equilibrium of the fixed and variable rate tenders. 
In this setup, assumption (7) is replaced by the following assumption 
(14) 
that guarantees that the banks have an aggregate amount of collateral that is greater 
than the central bank's maximum liquidity injection. 
The strategy of a bank with collateral c in the fixed rate tender is given by a 
function b(c) that describes the amount bid as a function of its collateraL Two cases 
will be considered. In the first case we require b(e) E [0, cJ, while in the second we 
let b(c) E [0, iiJ, with ii > c, but require the bank to have enough collateral to cover 
the allotted. amount.ll Similarly, in variable rate tenders the strategy of a bank with 
collateral e is a pair (b(e), r(e)) that describes the amount bid and the interest rate 
offered as a function of its collateral. As in fixed rate tenders, we will consider the 
cases b(e) E [O,c[ and b(c) E [O,b]. 
The following result characterizes the equilibrium of fixed. rate tenders. 
Proposition 5 In the fixed rate tender with b(e) E [0, cJ, when the loss function of 
the centrol bank is asymmetric (-y > 0) there is a unique equilibrium with b(c) = c, 
\1 As noted in Section 3, this is what the ECB requires. 
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whereas when the loss junction is symmetric (-y = 0) any feasible junction b( c) such 
that f� b(c) dH(c) 2: s,(Til constitutes an equilibrium. On the other hand, in the fixed 
rate tender with b(c) E [0, b), when'Y > ° there is a unique equilibrium implicitly 
described by 
b(c) = min {s:;�),b}, (15) 
where b' = f� b( c) dH (c), whereas when 'Y = ° any junction b( c) such that 
{ b'c -} b(c) $ min 
s,(il) 
, b , (16) 
where b' = f� b(c) dH(c) 2: s,(il), constitutes an equilibrium. In any of these cases, 
the central bank provides an amount of liquidity equal to s,(1)), and the expected 
equilibrium interbank rate is r -y' 
Thus when the loss function of the central bank is asymmetric, the banks bid 
the maximum amount compatible with satisfying the collateral requirement with 
probability one. If b(c) is constrained to belong to the interval [0, cl they bid their 
collateral c, while if b(c) may belong to [0, b) they bid either the maximum amount b 
or the maximum amount that ensures that the collateral requirement 
s,(1)) 
b(c) < c 
b* -
, 
is satisfied for all 1) E l!/,1)], which gives (15). In both cases the equilibrium payoff of 
a bank with collateral c is given by 
Since the function b(c) is non decreasing and r, - f > 0, it follows that the high 
collateral banks get a higher payoff than the low collateral banks. On the other hand, 
when the loss function is syrrunetric, there are multiple equilibria in which all the 
banks get a zero payoff. 
A simple numerical example will serve to illustrate these results. Suppose that the 
loss function of the central bank is asymmetric (-y > 0) and that collateral is uniformly 
distributed in the interval [0, II. Then in the case b(c) E [0, cl the banks bid b(c) = c, 
while in the case b(c) E [0, b) (and assuming that s,(1)) = 1/3 so (14) is satisfied) 
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one can check that the banks bid b(c) = min{3b"c, ii} with b" = ii(3 + 13)/6 12 Since 
'Y > 0 implies that the expected equilibrium interbank rate r"1 will be greater than the 
tender rate 7, the central bank will be effectively transferring rents to the banks in 
proportion to their bids. The distributional implications of the two alternative cases 
are shown in Table 1 .  The example illustrates how banks with higher collateral get 
a higher proportion of these rents, and how the distribution becomes more uneven 
when the banks can only bid up to their collateral.13 
Table 1 Share of rents going to banks 
in different quartiles of the distribution of collateraL 
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile 
b(c) E [0, cl 6.25% 18.75% 31.25% 43 . .75% 
b(c) E [0, iii 9.38% 27.23% 31.70% 31 .70% 
It is important to note that to the extent that different banking practices and 
traditions in the various countries of the euro zone imply that banks with similar 
balance sheets but located in different countries may have different C'8, and provided 
that the loss function of the ECB is asymmetric, the fixed rate tender procedure 
implies unequal treatment of banks. In particular) those banks located in countries 
with a higher structural level of collateral will get a higher share of the total rents 
that the ECB hands over by keeping the average interbank rate above the tender rate 
r. 
We next consider what happens when the central bank uses variable rate tenders. 
Proposition 6 In variable rate tenders with b(c) E [O,c], any feasible function b(c) 
such that It b(c) dH(c) 2: s,('ij) , together with the function 1'(c) = r" constitutes 
an equilibrium. On the other hand, in variable rate tenders with b(c} E [O)b]) any 
function b(c) such that { b"c -} b(c) :": min 
s, (1j)
' b  , 
12In this latter case the banks with collateral c .s:  bj3b· c::::: .42 bid an amount b(c) = 3b*c which is 
linearly increasing in c, whereas the banks with c 2: b/3b* bid the maximum amount bec) = b. 
13It is worth noting that the second distribution does not depend on the upper limit b. This is a 
general result that follows from the fact that the equilibrium bid bee) is proportional to b. 
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where b' = J� b( c) dH (c) � So (ry), together with the function r( c) = r 0' constitutes an 
equilibrium. In either case, the central bank provides an amount of liquidity equal to 
s"f (TJ), and the expected equilibrium interbank rate is r'"f ' 
As in the model with identical banks, the nature of equilibrium is the same for 
all "I � O. The bids of the banks may now be different, but they all offer the same 
interest rate r 1', which is the expected equilibrium interbank rate for the value of 'Y 
that characterizes the loss function of the central bank, so their payoff is always equal 
to zero. 
Hence we have shown that using fixed rate tenders when the loss function of the 
central bank is asymmetric may lead to unequal treatment of the banks, and that 
this problem disappears under variable rate tenders. 
6 Is the Loss Function of the ECB Asymmetric? 
In previous sections we have shown that the equilibrium outcome of fixed rate tenders 
critically depends on the syrrunetry or asymmetry of the loss function of the central 
bank. In this section we use data for the period 4 January 1999 - 27 June 2000 in 
which the ECB conducted 76 fixed rate tenders to test whether the parameter "I of 
its loss function is significantly different from zero. In addition, we use data for the 
period 28 June - 23 August 2000 in which the ECB conducted 9 variable rate tenders 
to get some preliminary evidence on the predictions of our model. 
Since a symmetric loss function implies that, for fixed rate tenders, the differential 
between the interbank rate r and the tender rate f will on average be zero, an indirect 
and simple way of testing the null hypothesis 'Y = 0 is to test whether 
The results for the period January 1999 - June 2000 are shown in Table 2a. In this 
table the tender rate f is the interest rate of the main refinancing operations of the 
EeB, and two alternative measures of the interbank rate r are considered: the l-week 
euro interbank offered rate (Euribor-7) and the euro overnight interest rate (Eonia) .14 
14Euribor is the rate at which a prime bank is willing to lend funds in euro to another prime 
bank, and is computed as the average of the daily offer rates of a representative panel of prime 
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It is worth noting that when comparing the interest rates on interbank deposits with 
the rate of the main refinancing operations there are two potential biases that might 
affect the spread r-r. First, differences in credit risk: The main refinancing operations 
are collateralized while interbank deposits are unsecured, which may bias the spread 
upwards. Second, differences in maturity: The interest rate on the main refinancing 
operations has a positive term premium when compared to rates on less-than-tw� 
week deposits, which may bias the spread downwards.I5 In the case of Euribor-7, the 
difference in maturity is only one week and credit risk is likely to be very small (since 
it is a rate offered to prime banks), SO the two biases are probably negligible. On the 
other hand, Eonia might be subject to higher biases, pointing in opposite directions 
so their net effect is difficult to evaluate, but it is the interest rate corresponding to 
the most active segment of the interbank market. 
To check the robustness of the results three alternative samples have been consid­
ered for the Eonia rate: a sample including only the days of settlement of the tender 
(with n = 76 observations), a second sample including all days except those corre­
sponding to the end of the monthly maintenance periods of the reserve requirement 
(with n = 367), and finally the whole sample (with n = 385) ." In each case, the point 
estimate jl, its standard error, the p-value of the one-sided test of the null hypothesis 
fJ. = 0 (against the alternative fJ. > 0), and the sample size are reported. 
Table 2a Estimation of fJ. = E(r) - f for the period January 1999 - June 2000. 
r = Euribor-7 r = Eonia 
jl .13 .08 
(s.e.) (02) (02) 
[p-value] [.00] [.00] 
n 76 76 
r = Eonia 
.08 
(01) 
[.00] 
367 
r = Eonia 
.07 
(.01) 
[.00] 
385 
banks. Eonia is an effective overnight rate computed as a weighted average of the interest rates on 
unsecured overnight contracts on deposits denominated in euro reported by a panel of contributing 
banh 
15Unfortullately, the market for tw�week deposits is not active enough as to offer reliable interest 
rates. 
16We have not used these three samples with t.he Euribor due to the overlapping nature of the 
data. 
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The four columns of Table 2a convey the same qualitative result: J1. is significantly 
greater than zero, and therefore the null hypothesis of a symmetric loss function for 
the ECB can be rejected, even at a confidence level of 1 %. 
One criticism that can be made about these results is that they do not take 
into account the fact that, from November 1999 until June 2000, the ECB raised 
the interest rate of the main refinancing operations in five occasions. To the extent 
that this decisions were anticipated by the banks, they would have had an incentive 
to front-load their demands for liquidity, thereby putting an upward pressure on 
interbank rates. To check whether our estimate of J1. may be biased by this effect, the 
first row of Table 2b reports the results for a sample that excludes the data for the 
two weeks prior to an interest rate change, while the second row restricts the sample 
to the year 1999 in which there were two interest rate changes of opposite sign. As 
in Table 2a, the first column of Table 2b uses Euribor-7 as the interbank rate, while 
the last three columns use Eonia for, respectively, only the days of settlement of the 
tender, all days except the last days of the maintenance periods, and all days within 
the prespecified sample. 
Table 2b Estimation of J1. = E(r) - f 
for the period January 1999 - June 2000 under alternative samples. 
T = Euribor-7 
Ii .11  
(s.e.) (.01 ) 
iJ>-value] [.00] 
n 64 
Ii .10 
(s.e.) (02) 
iJ>-valueJ [.00] 
n 51 
T = Eonia 
.05 
(02) 
[.01] 
64 
.03 
(.02) 
[.12] 
51 
T = Eonia 
.04 
(01) 
[.00] 
308 
.04 
(.01) 
[.00] 
247 
r = Eonia 
.03 
(.01) 
[.00] 
325 
.03 
(.01) 
[.01] 
259 
Moving from Table 2a to either the first or the second row of Table 2b reduces the 
estimated value of j.L, so expectations about interest rate changes do seem to matter, 
but 'ji, is still significantly different from zero (except for the 1999 sample when only 
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the days of settlement of the tender are considered). Hence we can safely reject the 
null hypothesis of a symmetric loss function for the ECB. 
A more direct test of the null hypothesis -y = 0 can be performed by exploiting 
the first order condition that characterizes the optimal decision of the central bank 
(see Lemma 1): 
Since according to OUf model the liquidity provided by the central bank in each ten­
der, s..,(TJ}, is a function of the signal TJ, we can estimate "t by the Generalized Method 
of Moments (GMM) using as instruments a constant and the liquidity effectively pr<>­
vided by the ECB through its main refinancing operationsl1 The results for the four 
alternative samples considered in Table 2a are summarized in Table 3a. In this table 
we report the point estimate 7, its standard error (robust to both heter05kedasticity 
and autoocrrelation), the p-value of the one-sided test of the null hypothesis -y = 0 
(against the alternative -y > 0), the p-value of the Sargan test, and the sample size. 
Table 3a Estimation of the ECB's loss function parameter -y 
for the period January 1999 - June 2000. 
r = Euribor-7 r = Eonia r = Eonia r = Eonia 
"i 59.9 2:61 2.92 1 .82 
(s.e.) (35.I) (1.58) (1.22) (.84) 
(p-value] [.04] [.05] [.01] [.02] 
Sargan (p-value] [.45] [.63] [.53] [.71] 
n 76 76 367 385 
There are no substantial differences in the qualitative results in the four columns of 
Table 3: the null hypothesis of a symmetric loss function for the ECB can be rejected, 
and the instruments chosen pass the Sargan test without difficulty. The important 
quantitative difference in the estimated value of -y using Euribor-7 (column 1) and 
Eonia (columns 2-4) is due to the fact that, as reported in Table 2a, the average 
differential between Euribor-7 and the rate of the main refinancing operations is 13 
17Note that at each point in time there are two main refinancing opera.tions outstanding, so we 
have taken as instrument the sum of amounts injected in them. 
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basis points, while the differential between Eonia and this rate is only 7 or 8 basis 
points. In order to rationalize this difference within our model, we require a much 
higher value of"( in the former case. 
To check whether our estimate of "( may be biased by expectations of changes in 
the stance of monetary policy (in particular interest rate increases), Table 3b reports 
the results for the same samples as in Table 2a: the first row excludes the data for 
the two weeks prior to an interest rate change, while the second restricts the sample 
to the year 1999. As before, moving from Table 3a to Table 3b reduces 1, but for 
most of the cases we can still reject the null hypothesis of a symmetric loss function 
for the ECB (at a 10% confidence level). 
Table 3b Estimation of the ECB's loss function parameter 'Y 
for the period January 1999 - June 2000 under alternative samples. 
r = Euribor-7 r = Eonia r = Eonia r = Eonia 
1 43.6 1.43 1.54 .S2 
(s.e.) (26.7) (1.05) (.S3) (.56) 
[p-value] [.05] [.09] [.03] [.07] 
Sargan [p-value] [.49] [ 5S] [.9S] [.Sl] 
n 64 64 30S 325 
1 46.3 .67 1.18 .60 
(s.e.) (35.0) (.67) (.7S) (.54) 
[p-value] [.09] [.16] [.07] [.14] 
Sargan [p-value] [.55] [.75] [.75] [.96] 
n 51 51 247 259 
All in all, the empirical evidence is consistent with an explanation of the overbid­
ding by the banks in the fixed rate tenders conducted by the ECB until June 2000 
based on its aversion to seeing interbank rates fall below the tender rate. The ECB 
then supplied less liquidity than that reqllired to keep the average interbank rate 
at the level of the tender rate, and the banks run for the rents associated with the 
differential between these two rates. 
As noted in the Introduction, the tender system used by the ECB in its main 
refinancing operations was changed to variable rate (American) tenders in June 2000. 
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In its press release) the ECB noted that the switch to variable rate tenders should 
not be interpreted as a change in the stance of monetary policy, but simply a way 
to deal with the overbidding problem. Thus we have an ideal setting to rheck the 
predictions of our theoretical model. 
In what follows we look at the evidence on three specific implications of our 
analysis of variable rate tenders: (i) the marginal auction rate should be equal to the 
expected interbank rate, (ii) the marginal rate should coincide with the average rate) 18 
and (iii) the degree of overbidding should be smaller than under fixed rate tenders. 
In addition, assuming that the loss function of the central bank is not altered by the 
change in the tender system (i.e. that the parameter,), is the same), the difference 
between the marginal and the minimum bid rate should be equal to the difference 
between the expected interbank rate and the tender rate prior to the change. 
The evidence on these predictions for the first 9 variable rate tenders conducted by 
the EeB is as follows. First, the mean spread between the interbank rate (for the days 
of settlement of the tender) and the marginal auction rate has been 8 basis points for 
the I-week Euribor, and -1 basis point for Eonia. These figures are smaller that those 
observed under the previous system, and the one for Ecmia is essentially zero. Second) 
the mean difference between the average and the marginal auction rate has only been 
1 basis point. This is strikingly small, since one would have expected a fair amoWlt of 
dispersion of the bids during an initial learning period. Third, the median allotment 
ratio has been 49.10%, whirh is 8 times higher than the corresponding figure for the 
period under fixed rate tenders. Finally, the mean spread between the marginal and 
the minimum bid rate has been 7 basis points) which is in line with the estimated 
values of J1. in Table 2a. Hence we conclude that the evidence collected so far from the 
variable rate tenders is consistent with the predictions of our model) although formal 
statistical testing will have to wait until there is more data. 
7 Concluding Remarks 
We have developed a model of the tender procedures used by the ECB in its open 
market operations. The model has two novel features. First we endogenize the 
18This rate is the weighted average interest rate at which liquidity is supplied by the EeB. 
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behavior of the central bank by postulating an objective function that depends on 
the deviations between the interbank rate and a target rate that characterizes the 
stance of monetary policy. Second we assume that there is an efficient interbank 
market in which the banks can always get liquidity, so their objective in participating 
in the central bank tenders is not to cover their liquidity needs but to profit from 
differentials between the interbank rate and the tender rate. 
The analysis shows that when the central bank is more concerned about inter­
bank rates below the target than about interbank rates above the target (Le. when 
its objective function is asymmetric), fixed rate tenders have a unique equilibrium 
characterized by extreme overbidding. The reason for this result is simple: the cen­
tral bank tries to avoid low interbank rates by restricting the supply of liquidity, and 
this opens a differential between the expected interbank rate and the tender rate 
which the banks try to exploit by increasing the size of their bid. In contrast, vari­
able rate tenders allow the banks to compete away this differential by offering higher 
rates, so in equilibrium they will be indifferent as to the amount bid (as long as the 
aggregate bid is sufficiently large to accommodate the central bank's desired liquidity 
injection). 
Our empirical analysis based on the fixed rate tenders conducted by the ECB 
from January 1999 to June 2000 shows an average spread between the euro overnight 
interest rate and the tender rate of 4 or 5 basis points (depending on the way in 
which the sample is constructed). This spread is statistically different from zero, 
and supports the assumption of an asymmetric objective function for the ECB. In 
addition, the preliminary evidence from the variable rate tenders conducted from 
June 2000 is consistent with the predictions of our model. 
The framework put forward in this paper is useful for analyzing a number of issues 
in variable rate tenders like the difference in the equilibrium outcomes of single rate 
and multiple rate tenders (there is none), the advantage of announcing the intended 
liquidity injection (there is now an equilibrium without overbidding), and the effect 
of introducing a minimum bid rate that signals the monetary policy stance (there is 
none as long as the central bank has an effective way of signalling this stance without 
it). 
Finally, the framework may be useful for analyzing alternative tender procedures. 
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For example, for a fixed rate tender in which the central bank commits to satisfy 
100% of the bids of the banks at the target rate T, one can show that there is a 
unique symmetric equilibrium in which the representative bank bids an amount b = 
(a - f)/ fJ such that the expected equilibrium interbank rate r is equal to the target 
rate r. Althougb there is no overbidding, the volatility of the interbank rate increases 
since now the central bank passively responds to the liquidity demands of the banks 
without taking into account its information on the autonomous liquidity creation and 
absorption factors. 
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Appendices 
A The Interbank Market 
This Appendix: presents a simple model that justifies the equilibrium interest rate 
equation (1) as well as the objective function (11) for the representative bank in­
troduced in Section 2. The model incorporates some key elements of the monetary 
policy framework of the ECB, in particular the existence of (i) a reserve requirement 
determined on the basis of the banks' average daily reserve holdings over a one-month 
maintenance period, and (ii) lending and deposit standing facilities where banks can 
obtain or place liquidity, respectively, at interest rates 1" and f" (with 1" > f"). 
Consider a model with three dates (t = 0,1,2). There is a representative bank 
that has to keep a level of reserves at dates t = i,2 (the maintenance period) such 
that 
(17) 
where it denotes the reserves held at date t = 1,2, ¢ is the reserve ratio, and do is 
the reserve base. These reserves are initially borrowed from the central bank at date 
o for the whole maintenance period, and later adjusted in the overnight interbank 
market at dates t = 1,2. If 10 denotes the reserves borrowed (at the rate f) from the 
central bank, then It - lo are the reserves acquired by borrowing (at the rate Tt) in 
the interbank market at date t = 1,2. 
The supply of reserves at dates t = 1,2 is given by l, = 10 + VI + II and I, = 
II + V, + h - II, respectively, where 10 is the liquidity provided by the centrai bank 
at date 0, VI and V2 are iid continuous random shocks with zero mean, and II and 
h are the recourse to the credit (if positive) or deposit (if negative) facilities at dates 
t = 1,2. Thus if the standing facilities are not used, reserves follow a random walk 
driven by the effect of the autonomous liquidity creation and absorption factors (like 
changes in cash holdings, net government deposits with the central bank, etc.). 
At date 2 the representative bank is going to set h in order to satisfy the reserve 
requirement (17). Equating the supply of reserves I, = l, + V, + h - II to the demand 
I, = 2¢do -II, and solving for h then gives 
h 
= 
2(¢do -10 - VI) - h - V,. 
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By arbitrage, the equilibrium interbank rate at date 2 will be equal to the lending rate 
r' (the deposit rate f") if the representative bank uses the lending (deposit) standing 
facility. Hence we have 
if h > 0 
if h < 0 (18) 
To determine the equilibrium interbank rate at date 1 we assume that the objective 
function of the representative bank is to minimize the expected cost of complying with 
the reserve requirement, that is 
subject to (17),19 Substituting l, = 2¢do - h from (17) into the objective function 
and rearranging yields 
(19) 
Since this expression is linear in i1• equilibrium requires 
Substituting (18) into this expression then gives 
Hence the equilibrium interbank rate at date 1 will be between pi and P. This implies 
that the representative bank will not want use the standing facilities at date 1, 50 
h = 0 and h = 2(¢do-lo- VI) - v" Since h > 0 if and only if v, < 2(¢do -lo - vd , 
the equilibrium interbank rate at date 1 can be written as 
"1 = f" + (r' - r")G[2(¢do - 10 - vdJ, (20) 
where G denotes the cumulative distribution function of the random liquidity shock 
/.12, According to this expression, the equilibrium interbank: rate at date 1 is a decreas­
ing function of the liquidity lo provided by the central bank at date 0, and from the 
19We are implicitly assuming that required reserves are not remunerated. If they were a negative 
constant term would appear in the objective function, but all the results would be Wlchanged. We 
also assume that the time intervals are sufficiently small so as to disregard any discoWlting of cash 
flows within the maintenance period. 
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point of view of this date it is a random variable that depends on the realization of 
the liquidity shock 1/1_ These are the two main features of the equilibrium interest rate 
equation (1) introduced in Section 2, which can be seen as a first order approximation 
to (20)2f1 
Finally, substituting rl = E1(T,) into (19), and leaving out the constant term, we 
get the following objective function for the representative bank 
min Eo [10 (f - Td + lo(f - T,)]. I, 
This function extends to the case of two-period central bank loans the objective 
function (11) in Section 2. 
B Proofs 
Proof of Lemma 1 Substituting (I) and (2) into the objective function (3) leads 
to the problem 
lU(I) 
min E[(<> -i>l + ry + u - f)' I ry] +, (<> - i>l + ry + u -f)' dF(u), I _� (21) 
where u(l) satisfies <> - i>l + ry + u(l) = f. The corresponding first order condition 
that implicitly defines s,(ry) is 
lU(I) 
<>-{31+ry-f+, _� (<>-!3l + ry + u-f) dF(u) =0. 
Integrating by parts the last term on the LHS, this condition simplifies to 
lU(I) 
<>-{31+ry-f--y _� F(u) du=O. 
Differentiating this expression then gives 
and 
os,(ry) 1+ ,F(u(l)) I 
-ary = {3[1 + ,F(u(l))] = /3' 
J�!'!! F(u) du 
{3[1 + -yF(u(l))] 
< O. 
Hence the function s,(ry) is linear in ry, with slope I/i> and an intercept that is de­
creasing in {, so we get (4) with r.., increasing in '"'(. Finally, for ,= 0 we can explicitly 
solve the first order condition to get so(ry) = (<> -f + ry)/{3, which implies TO = r .• 
20This approximation would be exact if the distribution of the liquidity shocks were uniform. 
-34-
Proof of Lemma 2 Substituting (10) and (2) into the objective function (3) leads 
to the problem 
min EI(a -/l min {b', 8} + 1) + u -1')' 11)1 , 
jue,) 
+, _� (a-/lmin{b',8}+1)+u-1')'dF(u), 
where U(8) satisfies Q -/l min {b', 8} + 1) + u( 8) = r. The function to be minimized 
coincides with the convex function in (21) for 8 :$ b', and it is constant for 8 � b'. 
Hence if 8,(1)) :$ b', it is clear that 8 = 8,(1)) is also the unique solution to the central 
bank's problem. On the other hand, if 8,(1)) > b' then any 8 � b' will be a solution, 
so we can take 8 = 8,(Ti).-
Proof of Proposition 1 Substituting (8) and (10) into (11), and using the result 
in Lenuna 2, gives the following objective function for the representative bank 
Since this function is linear in the bid b, the bank's optimal behavior is to bid the 
maximum amount c if the coefficient of b is positive, and any b E [0, c] if it is zero. 
One can show that 
E [min { I, 8'b�1)) } (a - /l min {b', 8,(1))} +< - 1')] 
= E [E (min {I, 8��1))} (a -/lmin {b', 8,(1))} +< - 1') 11))] 
= E [min { I, 8'b�
1)) } (a -/l min {b', 8,(1))} + 1) -1')] 
= E [min {I, 8'b�1
))
} l/l (8,(1)) - min {b', 8,(1))}) + r, - 1'1] 
= 
E 
�max{8,(1)) - b',O} + min {I, 8'b�1
))
} 
(r, - r)
] 
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with strict inequality for '"Y > 0, where the first equality follows from the law of 
iterated expectations, the second from the application of the conditional expectations 
operator, the third from the definition of s,(ry) , the fourth from that fact that s,(ry)­
min {b',s,(ry)} = max{s,(ry) - b',O} = 0 whenever min {1,s,(ry)/b'} < 1, and the 
inequality follows from (6) together with the result that r, is increasing in 'I with 
TO = r. 
Now E[max{s,(ry) - b',O}] 2 a implies that for 'I > 0 the representative bank 
has an incentive to set b = c. On the other hand, for '"Y = 0, if b· < so(1j) we have 
E[max{ so(ry) -b', O}] > 0, so the bank has an incentive to set b = c, which contradicts 
the assumption b' < so(ij) < c. Hence it must be the case that b' 2 so(ij) , in which 
case E[ma..x{so(ry) - b',O}] = 0 and any b E [so(ij),c] constitutes an equilibrium .• 
Proof of Proposition 2 From the proof of Proposition 1, it is clear that the 
objective function of the representative bank now becomes 
We have shown that 
with strict inequality for 'I > O. Now max{s,(ry) - b',O} 2 a implies that for 'I > 0 
the representative bank has an incentive to set b = c. On the other hand, for '"Y = 0, 
if b' < so(ry) we have max{so(ry) - b',O} > 0, so the bank has an incentive to set 
b = c, which contradicts the assumption b· < sO(1]) < c. Hence it must be the case 
that b' 2 so(ry), in which case any b E [So(ry), c] constitutes an equilibrium . •  
Proof of Proposition 3 Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 1 
one can show that if the representative bank offers an interest rate r = r- its objective 
functio'n becomes 
bE [min {I, S'b�
ry)
} (a - ,Bmin lbo, s,(ry)) + € -r)] 
= bE [,Bmax{s,(ry) - b', O} + min {I, S'b�
ry)
} (r, - r)] . 
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There are two cases to consider. First suppose that 
E �max{s,('I) - b', a} + min {I, S'b�'I)} h - r)] > a. 
Then we can only have an equilibrium with b· = c) which by assumption (7) implies 
s-r(r;) < b·, so the previous expression reduces to 
E [s'b�'I) (T, - r)] = 
E[s;,
('1)[ (T, - r) > a. 
Now if the representative bank were to offer r > r its objective function would 
become 
But then 
r - r > E[s,('I)] (T - r) > a 'Y b* 'Y 
implies that the representative bank has an incentive to deviate from r = T* , so there 
is no equilibrium in this case. 
Next suppose that 
E �max{s,('I) - b', a} + min {I, S'b�'1)} (To - r)] = a. 
If s,(Ti) > b' we have E[max{s,('I) - b',a}] > a, so it must be the case that r, < "'. 
Now if the representative bank were to offer r = r"l < r* its objective function would 
become 
But since 
the bank has an incentive to deviate from r = r. Finally, if s,(r;) S b' the expression 
at the beginning of this paragraph reduces to, 
E[s,('I)] ( _ �) = a b. T'Y r , 
which implies r"l = r*. Now if the representative bank were to deviate by offering 
r < T* its payoff would be zero) while if it offered r > r its objective function would 
become b(r, - T') = a. Hence any bid b E [s,(Ti),c] at the rate T = r, constitutes an 
equilibrium .• 
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Proof of Proposition 4 From the proof of Proposition 3, it is clear that if the 
representative bank offers an interest rate r = r· its objective function becomes 
Ai; before there are two cases to consider. First suppose that 
jJmax{so(ry) - bO, O} + min { 1, SOb�
ry)
} 
(TO - r) > o. 
Then we can only have an equilibrium with b· = c, which by assumption (7) implies 
5,.(77) < b., so the previous expression reduces to 
Now if the representative bank were to offer r > i* its objective function would 
become 
But then 
TO - r > SOb�
ry) (To - r) > O. 
implies that the representative bank has an incentive to deviate from r = T* , so there 
is no equilibrium in this case. 
Next suppose that 
jJmax{so(ry) - bO, O} + min {I, SOb�
ry)
} 
(TO - r) = o. 
If so(ry) > bO we have max{so(ry) - bO,O} > 0, so it must be the case that To < r. 
Now if the representative bank were to offer r = T-y < T* its objective function would 
become bjJ(so(ry) - bO), so the bank has an incentive to deviate from r = r. Finally, 
if so(ry) S bO the expression at the beginning of this paragraph reduces to, 
so(ry) (T _ r) = 0 b* -y , 
which implies T"f = r*. Now if the representative bank were to deviate by offering 
r < T* its payoff would be zero, while if it offered r > i* its objective function would 
become b(TO - 1'") = o. Hence any bid b E [so(ry), cJ at the rate TO constitutes an 
equilibrium . • 
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Proof of Proposition 5 The result for the case where b(c) E [O, cl follows imme­
diately from the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1. For the case b(c) E [O, b],  
the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 imply that when 'Y > ° the 
banks have an incentive to bid the maximum amount compatible with having enough 
collateral to cover the allotted amount, which gives (15). To prove uniqueness let us 
define 
D(bO) = t min {s:;;) ' b} dH(c). 
This function is continuous and satisfies 
and 
where 
b* c D(bO) = -(_) f c dH(c), s..., 1] Jo 
for bO < 0 = s,(mb - c '  
bO lo'lb') -1' D(bO) = 
-(_) c dH(c) + b dH(c), 5-y 1] 0 e(hO) 
c(bO) = S'i7)b. 
for b* > r ,  
Hence for bO � bO the function D(bO) is linear, and by assumption (14) has a slope 
greater than one, and for b* > fj'" one can check that 
1 la'lb') 
D'(bO) = -(-) c dH(c) > 0, s, 11 0 
D"(bO) < 0, and limb'_� D(bO) = b, so the equation D(bO) = bO has a unique solution. 
Finally, the result for 'Y = ° follows immediately from the arguments in the proof of 
Proposition 1 . •  
Proof of Proposition 6 Follows immediately from the arguments in the proof of 
Proposition 3 . •  
-39-

References 
[I] Bindseil, Ulrich (2000), "Forecasting Autonomous Liquidity Factors: Quality, 
Publication and the Control of the Overnight Rate", rnimeo. 
[2] Campbell, John Y. (1987), "Money Announcements, the Demand for Bank Re­
serves, and the Behavior of the Federal Fund Rate within the Statement Week" , 
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 19, pp. 56-67. 
[3] Cataliio Lopes, Margarida (2000), "Financing in the Eurosystem: Fixed versus 
Variable Rate Tenders" , mimeo. 
[4] European Central Bank (1998), The Single Monetary Policy in Stage Three. 
General Documentation on ESCB Monetary Policy Instruments and Procedures, 
Frankfort am Main. 
[5] European Central Bank (2000), Annual Report 1999, Frankfort am Main. 
[6] Favero, Carlo, et al. (2000), One Money, Many Countries, Monitoring the Eu­
ropean Central Bank 2, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. 
[7] Hamilton, James D . ,  (1996), "The Daily Market for Federal Funds" , Journal of 
Political Economy, 104, pp. 25-56. 
[8J International Monetary Fund (1999), International Capital Markets. Develop­
ments, Prospects, and Key Policy Issues, Washington. 
[9J Nautz, Dieter, and Jilrg Oechssler (1999), "The Repo Auctions of the European 
Central Bank and the Vanishing Quota Puzzle", Discussion Paper No. 79, SFB 
373, Humboldt-University Berlin. 
[10J Perez-Quir6s, Gabriel, and Hugo Rodriguez-Mendizabal (2000), "The Daily Mar­
ket for Funds in Europe: Has Something Changed with E.MU?", mimeo. 
- 41 -

WORKING PAPERS (1) 
9708 Jeffrey Franks: Labor market policies and unemployment dynamics in Spain. 
9709 Jose Ramon Martinez Resano: Los mercados de derivados y el euro. 
9710 Juan Ayuso and J. David Lopez-Salido: Are ex-post real interest rates a good proxy for 
ex-allte real rates? An international comparison within a CCAPM framework. 
9711 Ana Buis3n y Miguel Perez: Un indicador de gasto en construcci6n para la economfa espanola. 
9712 Juan J. Dolado, J. David L6pez-Salido and Juan Luis Vega: Spanish unemployment and in­
flation persistence: Are there phillips trade-offs? 
9713 Jose M. Gonzalez Minguez: The balance-sheet transmission channel of monetary policy: 
The cases of Germany and Spain. 
9714 Olympia Bover. Cambios en la composici6n del empJeo y actividad laboral femenina. 
9715 Francisco de Castro and Alfonso Novales: The joint dynamics of spot and forward exchange 
rates. 
9716 Juan Carlos Caballero, Jorge Martinez y M: Teresa Sastre: La utilizaci6n de los indices de 
condiciones monetarias desde la perspectiva de un banco central. 
9717 Jose Viiials y Juan F. Jimeno: EI mercado de trabajo espanol y la Uni6n Econ6mica y Mo· 
netana Europea. 
9718 Samuel BentoUla: La inmovilidad del trabajo en las regiones espanolas. 
9719 Enrique AJberola, Juan Ayuso and J. David L6pez-Salido: When may peseta depreciations 
fuel inflation? 
9720 Jose M. Gonzalez Minguez: The back calculation of nominal historical series after the intro· 
duction of the european currency (An application to the GDP). 
9721 Una-Louise Bell: A Comparative Analysis of the Aggregate Matching Process in France, 
Great Britain and Spain. 
9722 Francisco Alonso Sanchez, Juan Ayuso Huertas y Jorge Martinez Pages: EI pader predictivo 
de los tipos de interes sabre la tasa de. inflaci6n espanola. 
9723 Isabel Argimon, Concha Artola y Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo: Empresa publica y em­
presa privada: titularidad y eficiencia relativa. 
9724 Enrique AJberoia and Pierfederico Asdrubali: How do countries smooth regional disturban­
ces? Risksharing in Spain: 1973-1993. 
9725 Enrique Alberola, Jose Manuel Marques and Alicia Sanchis: Unemployment persistence, 
Central Bank independence and inflation performance in the OECD countries. (The Spa­
nish original of this publication has the same number,) 
9726 Francisco Alonso, Juan Ayuso and Jorge Martinez Pages: How informative are financial as� 
set prices in Spain? 
9727 Javier Andres, Ricardo Mestre and Javier Valles: Monetary policy and exchange rate dyna­
mics in the Spanish economy. 
9728 Juan J. Dolado, Jose M. Gonzalez-Paramo y Jose Viiials: A cost-benefit analysis of going 
from low inflation to price stability in Spain. 
9801 Angel Estrada, Pilar Garcia Perea, Alberto Urtasun y Jesus Briones: Indicadores de pre· 
cios, costes y margenes en las diversas ramas productivas. 
9802 Pilar Alvarez Canal: Evoluci6n de la banca extranjera en el perfodo 1992·1996. 
9803 Angel Estrada y Alberto Urtasun: Cuantificacion de expectativas a partir de las encuestas 
de opini6n. 
9804 Soyoung Kim: Monetary Policy Rules and Business Cycles. 
9805 Victor Gomez and Agustin Maranll: Guide for using the programs TRAMO and SEATS. 
9806 Javier Andres, Ignacio Hernando and J. David Lopez-Salido: Disinflation, output and 
unemployment: the case of Spain. 
9807 Olympia Bover, Pilar Garcia-Perea and Pedro Portugal: A comparative study of the Por­
tuguese and Spanish labour markets. 
9808 Victor Gomez and Agustin Maravall: Automatic modeling methods for univariate series. 
9809 Victor Gomez and Agustin MaranH: Seasonal adjustment and signal extraction in econo­
mic time series. 
9810 Pablo Hernandez de Cos e Ignacio Hernando: El credito comercial en las empresas manu­
factureras espanolas. 
9811 Soyoung Kim: Identifying European Monetary Policy Interactions: French and Spanish Sys­
tem with German Variables. 
9812 Juan Ayuso, Roberto Blanco y Alicia Sanchis: Una clasificaci6n por riesgo de los fondos 
de inversi6n espanoles. 
9813 Jose Vtiials: The retreat of inflation and the making of monetary policy: where do we stand? 
9814 Juan Ayuso, Graciela L. Kaminsky and David Lopez-Salido: A switching-regime model fOT 
the Spanish inflation: 1962-1997. 
9815 Roberto Blanco: Transmisi6n de informaci6n y volatilidad entre el mercado de futuros so­
bre el Indice Ibex 35 y el mercado al contado. 
9816 M.a Cruz Manzano and Isabel Sanchez: Indicators of short-term interest rate expectations. 
The information contained in the options market. (The Spanish original of this publication 
has the same number.) 
9817 Alberto Cabrero, Jose Luis Escriva, Emilio Munoz and Juan Penalosa: The controllability 
of a monetary aggregate in EMU. 
9818 Jose M. Gonzalez Minguez y Javier Santillan Fraile: El papel del euro en el Sistema Mo­
netario Internacional. 
9819 Eva Ortega: The Spanish business cycle and its relationship to Europe. 
9820 Eva Ortega: Comparing Evaluation Methodologies for Stochastic Dynamic General Equi­
librium Models. 
9821 Eva Ortega: Assessing the fit of simulated multivariate dynamic models. 
9822 Coral Garcia y Esther Gordo: Funciones trimestrales de export.aci6n e importaci6n para la 
economia espanola. 
9823 Enrique Aiberoia-lla and Timo Tyrvainen: Is there scope for inflation differentials in 
EMU? An empirical evaluation of the Balassa-Samuelson model in EMU countries. 
9824 Concha Artola e Isabel Argimon: Tilularidad y eficiencia relativa en las manufacturas es­
paiiolas. 
- 44-
9825 Javier Andres. Ignacio Hernando and J. David Lopez·Salido: The long-run effect of per­
manent disinOations. 
9901 Jose Ramon Martinez Resano: Instrumentos derivados de los tipos Overnight: call money 
swaps y futuros sabre fondos federales. 
9902 J. Andres, J. D. Lopez-Salido and J. Valles: The liquidity effect in a small open economy 
model. 
9903 Olympia Bover and Ramon Gomez: Another look at unemployment duration: long-term 
unemployment and exit to a permanent job. (The Spanish original of this publication has 
the same number.) 
9904 Ignacio Hernando y Josep A. Tribo: Relaci6n entre contratos laborales y financieros: Un 
estudio te6rico para el caso espanol. 
9905 Cristina Mazon and Soledad Nunez: On the optimality of treasury bond auctions: the Spa­
nish case. 
9906 Nadine Watson: Bank Lending Channel Evidence at the Firm Level. 
9907 Jose Vinals: EI marco general de la poiftica monetaria unica: racionalidad, consecuencias y 
cuestiones pendientes. 
9908 Olympia Bover and Manuel Arellano: Learning about migration decisions from the mi­
grants: an exercise in endogenous samplig and complementary datasets. 
9909 Olympia Bover and Pilar Velilla: Migrations in Spain: Historical background and current 
trends. 
9910 Fernando Restoy: Los mercados financieros espafioles ante la Uni6n Monetaria. 
9911 Luis J. Alvarez and M: de los Llanos Matea: Underlying inflation measures in Spain. 
9912 Regina Kaiser and Agustin Maravall: Estimation of the business cycle: a modified Hodrick­
Prescott filter. 
9913 Enrique Alberola and Jose Manuel Marques: On the relevance and nature of regional infla­
tion differentials: The case of Spain. 
9914 Agustin Maravall: An application of TRAMO and SEATS. Report for the «Seasonal Ad­
justment Research Appraisal» project. 
9915 Regina Kaiser and Agustin Maravall: Seasonal outliers in time series. 
9916 Enrique Alberola and Humberto LOpez: Internal and external exchange rate equilibrium in 
a cointegration framework. An application to the Spanish Peseta. 
9917 Jose Vinals and Javier Valles: On the real effects of monetary policy. 
9918 Regina Kaiser and Agustin MaravaH: Short-term and long-term trends, seasonal adjustment, 
and the business cycle. 
9919 J. Andres, J. D. Lopez-Salido and J. Valles: Intertemporal substitution and the liquidity 
effect in a sticky price modeL 
9920 J. Andres. I. Hernando and J. O. Lopez-Salida: The role of the financial system in the 
growth-inflation link: The OECD experience. 
9921 Angel Estrada and Ignacio Hernando: Microeconomic price adjustments and inflation: Evi­
dence from Spanish sectoral data. 
9922 Concha Artola and Una-Louise Bell: Identifying Labour Market Dynamics using Labour 
Force Survey Data. 
9923 Juan Ayuso and Roberto Blanco: Has financial market integration increased during the 
nineties? 
9924 Ignacio Fuentes and Teresa Sastre: Merkers and acquisitions in the Spanish Banking in­
dustry: some empirical evidence. 
0001 Georges Siotis: Market power, total factor productivity growth, and structural change. An 
illustration for Spain, 1983·1996. 
0002 Alberto Cabrero: Seasonal adjustment in economic time series: The experience of the Banco 
de Espana (with the model·based method). 
0003 Luis Gordo and Pablo Hernandez de Cos: The financing arrangements for the regional (au­
tonomous) governments for the period 1997·2001. (The Spanish original of this publication 
has the same number.) 
0004 J. Andres, F. Ballabriga and J. Valles: Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Behavior in the 
Fiscal Theory of the Price Level. 
0005 Michael Binder, Cheng Hsiao and M. Hashem Pesaran: Estimation and Inference in Short 
Panel Vector Autoregressions with Unit Roots and Cointegration. -
. 
0006 Enrique Alberola and Luis Molina: Fiscal discipline & Exchange Rate Regimes. A case for 
currency Boards? 
()()()7 Soledad NUiiez y Miguel Perez: La rama de servicios en Espana: un analisis comparado. 
0008 Olympia Bover and Nadine Watson: Are There Economies of Scale in the Demand for 
Money by Firms? Some Panel Data Estimates. 
0009 Angel Estrada, Ignacio Hernando and J. David LOpez-SaUdo: Measuring the NAIRU in 
the Spanish Economy. 
0010 Eva Ortega y Enrique Alberola: Transmisi6n de shocks y politica monetaria en la UEM. Un 
ejercicio con NIGEM. 
0011 Regina Kaiser and Agustin Marava)): An Application of TRAMO·SEATS: Changes in 
Seasonality and Current Trend·Cycle Assessment. The German Retail Trade Turnover Series. 
0012 Regina Kaiser and Agustin MaranH: Notes on Time Series Analysis, ARIMA Models 
and Signal Extraction. 
0013 JDrdi Gall, J. David LOpez-Salido and Javier Valles: Technology Shocks and Monetary 
Policy: Assessing the Fed's Performance. 
0014 Agustin Maravall and Fernando J. Sanchez: An Application of TRAMO·SEATS: Model 
Selection and Out-of·sample Performance. The Swiss CPI series. 
0015 Olympia Bover, Samuel BeotoliJa, and Manuel Arellano: The Distribution of Earnings in 
Spain during the 1980s: The Effects of Skill, Unemployment, and Union Power. 
0016 Juan Ayuso and Rafael RepuIlo: A Model of the Open Market Operations of the Euro­
pean Central Bank. 
(1) Previously published Working Papers are lisled in Ihe Banco de Espana publications catalogue. 
QUeries should be addressed to: Banco de Espana 
Seccion de Publicaciones. Negociado de Distribuci6n y Gesti6n 
Telephone: 91 338 5180 
Alcala, 50. 28014 Madnd 
